| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4293 |
| DP4293 Public Debt Management in Brazil | |
| Francesco Giavazzi; Alessandro Missale | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-03-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | According to the well-established tournament literature, incomplete information regarding employees? productivity is essential for the rationalization of (efficiency-enhancing) tournaments. In this Paper we propose an alternative rationalization of tournaments focusing on a fully informed principal whose objective is to maximize a weighted average of the profitability (productivity) of their team and of the promotion-seeking efforts of their employees. Our first main result clarifies the conditions under which the principal has an incentive to create a tournament that determines the promoted employee. We then examine the effect of the employees' productivity on their probability of promotion and on the extent of the resources wasted in the tournament. In particular, we specify the conditions that ensure that the most productive employee (the natural candidate for promotion) is less likely to be promoted and the conditions under which higher employee's productivity results in increased wasted promotion-seeking efforts. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Tournaments Promotion Wasted efforts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4293 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533254 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francesco Giavazzi,Alessandro Missale. DP4293 Public Debt Management in Brazil. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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