| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4300 |
| DP4300 The Expenditure Switching Effect and the Choice Between Fixed and Floating Exchange Rates | |
| Alan Sutherland; Ozge Senay | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-03-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policy-maker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truth telling, we show that the larger the inequality, the less information can credibly be transmitted to the policy-maker. We also investigate the effects of inequality on welfare, and discuss the welfare effects of institutions that increase transparency but which, as an unintended side effect, lower the lobbyist?s incentives for truth telling. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Lobbying Interest groups Reputation Information transmission Representation Inequality Bias |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4300 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533261 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alan Sutherland,Ozge Senay. DP4300 The Expenditure Switching Effect and the Choice Between Fixed and Floating Exchange Rates. 2004. |
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