| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP4310
|
| DP4310 Market Integration and Economic Development: A Long-Run Comparison |
| Wolfgang Keller; Carol Shiue
|
| 发表日期 | 2004-03-23
|
| 出版年 | 2004
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Implementing incentive systems can sometimes backfire in practice: experimental evidence and folklore both suggest that offers of explicit rewards can expose surprising discontinuities in behaviour. This Paper models two such discontinuities that have been claimed by psychologists and experimental economists to constitute important exceptions to the standard economic theory of human motivation. The first (?type discontinuity?) is the observation of a discontinuity in the distribution across population types of values of the willingness to accept payment in return for performing certain (?civic?) actions, such as giving blood or performing public service. It is claimed that this distribution is bimodal, even discontinuous: many people have a zero WTA, many have a large positive WTA, but nobody has a small positive WTA. The second (?payment discontinuity?, also known as ?crowding-out?) is that people who are willing to perform certain actions for free will refuse to perform them for a low price, even if they subsequently agree to perform them if the price is raised enough. Civic virtue may, on this view, be crowded out by the introduction of explicit incentives; people may stop doing things they were previously prepared to do without reward. The Paper shows that both phenomena may be observed as a result of individuals? acting in a first period of public service in the knowledge that the terms of their action signal their type, and their type will affect a process of assortative matching in a second period. Type Discontinuity, but not Payment Discontinuity, is observed in a signaling game in which individuals announce the prices at which they will perform a civic action. Payment Discontinuity, but not Type Discontinuity, is observed in a screening game in which individuals have only a binary participation decision available to signal their type. The proportion of individuals participating when rewards are zero can be higher than when rewards are positive but small. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Crowding effect
Intrinsic motivation
Assortative matching
Economic psychology
Incentive schemes
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4310
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533270
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Wolfgang Keller,Carol Shiue. DP4310 Market Integration and Economic Development: A Long-Run Comparison. 2004.
|
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
