| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4318 |
| DP4318 Regulation and Incentives in European Aviation | |
| Pedro Luis Marín Uribe; Philippe Gagnepain | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-03-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study private-value auctions with a large number of bidders. We calculate approximations of the equilibrium bids and the seller's revenue in first-price auctions regardless of whether the bidders are symmetric or asymmetric, or risk-neutral or risk-averse. Furthermore, we show that first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, or risk-averse bidders, are asymptotically revenue equivalent to wide classes of standard auctions. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Asymptotic methods Asymmetric auctions Revenue equivalence Collusion Large auctions Risk-averse bidders |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4318 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533278 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pedro Luis Marín Uribe,Philippe Gagnepain. DP4318 Regulation and Incentives in European Aviation. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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