| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4330 |
| DP4330 A New Way to Measure Competition | |
| jan boone | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-03-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this Paper we analyse an entrepreneur/manager?s choice between private and public ownership in a setting in which management needs some ?elbow room? or autonomy to manage the firm optimally. In public capital markets, the corporate governance regime in place exposes the firm to exogenous controls, so that management may lack the autonomy it desires. By contrast, private ownership can provide management with the desired autonomy due to the possibility of precisely-calibrated private contracting. The disadvantage of private ownership (relative to public ownership) is that it imposes a cost of illiquidity on those who provide financing. We explore this trade-off between managerial autonomy and the cost of capital in a simple setting and draw a number of new testable implications. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Ownership structures Stockmarket listing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4330 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533289 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | jan boone. DP4330 A New Way to Measure Competition. 2004. |
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