| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4353 |
| DP4353 Monetary Sovereignty, Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls: The Trilemma in the Interwar Period | |
| Maurice Obstfeld; Alan M. Taylor; Jay Shambaugh | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-04-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Economists long considered money illusion to be largely irrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion has powerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent pay-offs in nominal terms, choices converge to the Pareto inefficient equilibrium; however, if we lift the veil of money by representing pay-offs in real terms, the Pareto efficient equilibrium is selected. We also show that strategic uncertainty about the other players? behaviour is key for the equilibrium selection effects of money illusion: even though money illusion vanishes over time if subjects are given learning opportunities in the context of an individual optimization problem, powerful and persistent effects of money illusion are found when strategic uncertainty prevails. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Money illusion Coordination failure Equilibrium selection Multiple equilibria Coordination games |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4353 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533306 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Maurice Obstfeld,Alan M. Taylor,Jay Shambaugh. DP4353 Monetary Sovereignty, Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls: The Trilemma in the Interwar Period. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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