| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4363 |
| DP4363 Underpricing and Market Power in Uniform Price Auctions | |
| Kjell Nyborg; Ilan Kremer | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-04-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In uniform auctions, buyers choose demand schedules as strategies and pay the same ?market clearing? price for units awarded. Despite the widespread use of these auctions, the extant theory shows that they are susceptible to arbitrarily large underpricing. We make a realistic modification to the theory by allowing discrete prices, quantities and bids. We show that underpricing can be made arbitrarily small by choosing a sufficiently small price tick size and a sufficiently large quantity multiple. We also show how one might improve revenues by modifying the allocation rule. A trivial change in the design can have a dramatic impact on prices. Our conclusions are robust to bidders being capacity constrained. Finally, we examine supply uncertainty robust equilibria. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Discreteness market power Multi-unit auctions Supply uncertainty Treasury auctions Uniform price auctions Underpricing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4363 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533315 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kjell Nyborg,Ilan Kremer. DP4363 Underpricing and Market Power in Uniform Price Auctions. 2004. |
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