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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP4397 |
DP4397 Speed and Quality of Collective Decision-Making II: Incentives for Information Provision | |
Hans Peter Grüner; Elisabeth Schulte | |
发表日期 | 2004-04-23 |
出版年 | 2004 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We model educational investment, wages and employment status (full-time, part-time or non-participation) in a frictional world in which heterogeneous workers have different productivities, both at home and in the workplace. We investigate the degree to which there might be under-employment and distortions in human capital investment, and we then show how childcare policy can be used not only to correct the ex post under-participation problem but also to provide efficient incentives to invest optimally ex ante in education. |
主题 | Labour Economics |
关键词 | Part-time Full-time Education Market failure Childcare |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4397 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533325 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Peter Grüner,Elisabeth Schulte. DP4397 Speed and Quality of Collective Decision-Making II: Incentives for Information Provision. 2004. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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