| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4397 |
| DP4397 Speed and Quality of Collective Decision-Making II: Incentives for Information Provision | |
| Hans Peter Grüner; Elisabeth Schulte | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-04-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We model educational investment, wages and employment status (full-time, part-time or non-participation) in a frictional world in which heterogeneous workers have different productivities, both at home and in the workplace. We investigate the degree to which there might be under-employment and distortions in human capital investment, and we then show how childcare policy can be used not only to correct the ex post under-participation problem but also to provide efficient incentives to invest optimally ex ante in education. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Part-time Full-time Education Market failure Childcare |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4397 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533325 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Peter Grüner,Elisabeth Schulte. DP4397 Speed and Quality of Collective Decision-Making II: Incentives for Information Provision. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
