全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP4383 International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of the IMF's Catalytic Finance

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP4383
	DP4383 International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of the IMF's Catalytic Finance
	Nouriel Roubini; Giancarlo Corsetti; Bernardo Guimaraes
发表日期	2004-05-23
出版年	2004
语种	英语
摘要	This Paper estimates the structural parameters of a job search model with hyperbolic discounting and endogenous search effort. It estimates quantitatively the degree of hyperbolic discounting, and assesses its implications for the impact of various policy interventions aimed at reducing unemployment. The model is estimated using data on unemployment spells and accepted wages from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The likelihood function explicitly incorporates all the restrictions implied by the optimal dynamic programming solution to the model. Both observed and unobserved heterogeneity are accounted for. The results point to a substantial degree of hyperbolic discounting, especially for low and medium wage workers. The structural estimates are also used to evaluate alternative policy interventions for the unemployed. Estimates based on a model with exponential discounting may lead to biased inference on the economic impact of policies.
主题	Labour Economics ; Public Economics
关键词	Job search Hyperbolic discounting Structural estimation Policy evaluation
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp4383
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533337
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Nouriel Roubini,Giancarlo Corsetti,Bernardo Guimaraes. DP4383 International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of the IMF's Catalytic Finance. 2004.