| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4388 |
| DP4388 Non-Keynesian Fiscal Consolidation in the EU? Ex Post Evidence and Ex Ante Analysis | |
| Alessandro Turrini; Gabriele Giudice | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-05-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine a model in which the public is unsure about the competence of a politician, and whether they are concerned about the long-term consequences of their decisions (statesman) or about the public?s opinion concerning their competence and preferences (populist). The main finding suggests that the public benefits by disregarding the competence of candidates and by re-electing candidates based on their beliefs about whether a politician is a statesman. This paradox of competence might explain why politicians are so concerned about being perceived as statesmen. We also provide a rationale as to why governing by polls can be detrimental for society. Moreover, our model illustrates in general that delaying irreversible project decisions is a bad signal. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Populists Statesmen Paradox of competence Double-sided asymmetric information Polls |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4388 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533342 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandro Turrini,Gabriele Giudice. DP4388 Non-Keynesian Fiscal Consolidation in the EU? Ex Post Evidence and Ex Ante Analysis. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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