G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP4388
DP4388 Non-Keynesian Fiscal Consolidation in the EU? Ex Post Evidence and Ex Ante Analysis
Alessandro Turrini; Gabriele Giudice
发表日期2004-05-23
出版年2004
语种英语
摘要We examine a model in which the public is unsure about the competence of a politician, and whether they are concerned about the long-term consequences of their decisions (statesman) or about the public?s opinion concerning their competence and preferences (populist). The main finding suggests that the public benefits by disregarding the competence of candidates and by re-electing candidates based on their beliefs about whether a politician is a statesman. This paradox of competence might explain why politicians are so concerned about being perceived as statesmen. We also provide a rationale as to why governing by polls can be detrimental for society. Moreover, our model illustrates in general that delaying irreversible project decisions is a bad signal.
主题Public Economics
关键词Populists Statesmen Paradox of competence Double-sided asymmetric information Polls
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp4388
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533342
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Alessandro Turrini,Gabriele Giudice. DP4388 Non-Keynesian Fiscal Consolidation in the EU? Ex Post Evidence and Ex Ante Analysis. 2004.
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