| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4390 |
| DP4390 Sources of Gains from International Portfolio Diversification | |
| José Manuel Campa; Nuno Fernandes | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-05-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyse a general equilibrium model in which there is both adverse selection of and moral hazard by banks. The regulator has several tools at their disposal to combat these problems. They can audit banks to learn their type prior to giving them a license, they can audit them ex post to learn the success probability of their projects, and can impose capital adequacy requirements. When the regulator has a strong reputation for ex ante auditing they use capital requirements to combat moral hazard problems. For less competent regulators, capital requirements can substitute for ex ante auditing ability. In this case the banking system exhibits multiple equilibria so that crises of confidence in the banking system can occur only when the regulator?s reputation is poor. Contrary to conventional wisdom, depending on regulator reputation the appropriate policy response to a crisis of confidence may be to tighten capital requirements to improve the quality of surviving banks. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Capital requirements Banking crises |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4390 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533344 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | José Manuel Campa,Nuno Fernandes. DP4390 Sources of Gains from International Portfolio Diversification. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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