| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4400 |
| DP4400 Shareholder Value Creation in European M&As | |
| José Manuel Campa; Ignacio Hernando | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-06-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper provides a first applied game theory analysis of a technology-based climate protocol by assessing: (i) the self-enforcement (namely, the absence of incentives to free ride) of the coalition that would form when countries negotiate on climate-related technological cooperation; (ii) the environmental effectiveness of a technology-based climate protocol. The analysis is carried out using a model in which endogenous and induced technical changes are explicitly modelled and in which international technological spillovers are also quantified. The results of our analysis partly support Barrett?s and Benedick?s conjecture. On the one hand, a self-enforcing agreement is more likely to emerge when countries cooperate on environmental technological innovation and diffusion than when they cooperate on emission abatement. Technological cooperation ? without any commitment to emission control ? may not lead to a sufficient abatement of greenhouse gas concentrations, however. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Agreements climate Incentives Technological change Policy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4400 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533354 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | José Manuel Campa,Ignacio Hernando. DP4400 Shareholder Value Creation in European M&As. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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