| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4451 |
| DP4451 Earnings Inequality and the Business Cycle | |
| Daniel Tsiddon; Gadi Barlevy | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-06-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts. Many principals reward high efforts on both tasks with substantial bonuses. Agents anticipate this and provide high efforts on both tasks. In contrast, almost all agents with a piece-rate contract focus on the first task and disregard the second. Principals understand this and predominantly offer bonus contracts. This behaviour contradicts the self-interest theory but is consistent with theories of fairness. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Incentives Moral hazard Multiple tasks Fairness Experiments |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4451 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533400 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel Tsiddon,Gadi Barlevy. DP4451 Earnings Inequality and the Business Cycle. 2004. |
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