G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP4460
DP4460 Risk Sharing and EMU
Jacques MELITZ
发表日期2004-06-23
出版年2004
语种英语
摘要This Paper aims at answering the question: how does a typically 'European' bargaining system ? with collective bargaining, extension mechanisms and national minimum wage ? coexist with low unemployment rate and high wage flexibility? A unique dataset on workers, firms and collective bargaining contracts in the Portuguese economy is used to analyse the determinants of both the bargained wage and the wage drift. Results indicate that wage drift stretches the returns to every worker and firm attribute, whereas it shrinks the returns to union bargaining power. Therefore, firm-specific arrangements, in the form of wage drift, partly offset collective bargaining, granting firms a high degree of freedom when setting wages. Union bargaining power raises the overall wage level, but lowers the returns on worker attributes, an outcome of the egalitarian policy pursued.
主题Labour Economics
关键词Wage distribution Wage drift Union bargaining power Employer coordination
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp4460
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533408
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jacques MELITZ. DP4460 Risk Sharing and EMU. 2004.
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