全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP4463 Asymmetric Shocks and Risk Sharing in a Monetary Union: Updated Evidence and Policy Implications for Europe

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP4463
	DP4463 Asymmetric Shocks and Risk Sharing in a Monetary Union: Updated Evidence and Policy Implications for Europe
	Oved Yosha; Bent E Sørensen; Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan
发表日期	2004-06-23
出版年	2004
语种	英语
摘要	Some central banks have a reputation for being secretive. A justification for this behaviour that we find in the literature is that being transparent about operations and beliefs hinders the central bank in achieving the best outcome. In other words, a central bank needs flexibility and therefore cannot be fully transparent. Using a forward-looking New-Keynesian model, we find exactly the opposite. A central bank that is conservative improves output stabilization by being transparent about the procedures it uses to assess the economy and, especially, about the forecast errors it makes. Under certain conditions transparency by a conservative central bank also improves interest rate stabilization. We also find that higher transparency makes it optimal for the central bank to be more conservative as the benefits from higher transparency in terms of output stabilization are greater the more conservative the central bank is.
主题	International Macroeconomics
关键词	monetary policy Central bank Information processing Expectation formation
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp4463
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533411
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Oved Yosha,Bent E Sørensen,Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan. DP4463 Asymmetric Shocks and Risk Sharing in a Monetary Union: Updated Evidence and Policy Implications for Europe. 2004.