全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP4465 Sovereign Risk Premia in the European Bond Market

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP4465
	DP4465 Sovereign Risk Premia in the European Bond Market
	Jurgen von Hagen; Ludger Schuknecht; Kerstin Bernoth
发表日期	2004-07-23
出版年	2004
语种	英语
摘要	A model of group decision-making is studied, in which one of two alternatives must be chosen. While group members differ in their valuations of the alternatives, everybody prefers agreement to disagreement. Our model is distinguished by three features: private information regarding valuations, varying intensities in the preference for one outcome over the other, and the option to declare neutrality in order to avoid disagreement. We uncover a variant on the ?tyranny of the majority?: there is always an equilibrium in which the majority is more aggressive in pushing its alternative, thus enforcing their will via both numbers and voice. Under general conditions, however, an aggressive minority equilibrium inevitably makes an appearance, provided that the group is large enough. The notable exception is the special case of unanimity rule: we show that aggressive minority equilibria may never exist irrespective of group size. Aggressive minority equilibria invariably display a ?tyranny of the minority?: it is always true that the increased aggression of the minority more than compensates for smaller numbers, leading to the minority outcome being implemented with larger probability than the majority alternative. We fully characterize the asymptotic behavior of this model as group size becomes large, and show that all equilibria must converge to one of three possible limit outcomes.
主题	Public Economics
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp4465
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533413
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Jurgen von Hagen,Ludger Schuknecht,Kerstin Bernoth. DP4465 Sovereign Risk Premia in the European Bond Market. 2004.