| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4489 |
| DP4489 How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy | |
| Daniel Sturm; John List | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-07-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this Paper we explore to what extent secondary policy issues are influenced by electoral incentives. We develop a political agency model in which a politician decides on both a frontline policy issue, such as the level of public spending, and a secondary policy issue, such as environmental policy. The model shows under which conditions the incumbent finds it worthwhile to manipulate the secondary policy to attract additional votes to their platform. We test the predictions of the model using state-level panel data on Gubernatorial environmental policy choices over the years 1960-2000. In contrast to the popular view that choices on secondary policy instruments are largely determined by lobbying, we find strong effects of electoral incentives on environmental policy. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Elections Environmental policy Lobbying Term limits |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4489 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533433 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel Sturm,John List. DP4489 How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy. 2004. |
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