| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP4496
|
| DP4496 Oil and the Macroeconomy Since the 1970s |
| Robert Barsky; Lutz Kilian
|
| 发表日期 | 2004-07-23
|
| 出版年 | 2004
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Criminals are embedded in a network of relationships. Social ties among criminals are modelled by means of a graph where criminals compete for a bounty and benefit from local interactions with their neighbours. Each criminal decides in a non-cooperative way how much crime effort they will exert. We show that the Nash equilibrium crime effort of each individual is proportional to their equilibrium Bonacich-centrality in the network, thus establishing a bridge to the sociology literature on social networks. We then analyse a policy that consists of finding and getting rid of the key player, that is, the criminal who, once removed, leads to the maximum reduction in aggregate crime. We provide a geometric characterization of the key player identified with an optimal inter-centrality measure, which takes into account both a player?s centrality and their contribution to the centrality of the others. We also provide a geometric characterization of the key group, which generalizes the key player for a group of criminals of a given size. We finally endogeneize the crime participation decision, resulting in a key player policy, which effectiveness depends on the outside opportunities available to criminals. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Social Networks
Crime
Centrality measures
Key group
Policies
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4496
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533439
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Robert Barsky,Lutz Kilian. DP4496 Oil and the Macroeconomy Since the 1970s. 2004.
|
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