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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP4501 |
DP4501 Stock and Bond Returns with Moody Investors | |
Geert Bekaert; Eric Engstrom; Steve Grenadier | |
发表日期 | 2004-07-23 |
出版年 | 2004 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This Paper studies the effect of product market competition on the compensation packages that firms offer to their executives and in particular its impact on the sensitivity of pay to performance. To measure the effect of competition we use two different identification strategies on a panel of US executives. We exploit two deregulation episodes in the banking and financial sectors as quasi-natural experiments. We provide difference in differences estimates of the effect of competition on estimated performance-pay sensitivities and on the sensitivity of stock option grants. Our results indicate that a higher level of product market competition increases the performance pay sensitivity of executive compensation schemes. |
主题 | Labour Economics |
关键词 | Executive compensation Product market competition Performance related pay |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4501 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533443 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Geert Bekaert,Eric Engstrom,Steve Grenadier. DP4501 Stock and Bond Returns with Moody Investors. 2004. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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