| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP4512
|
| DP4512 Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control |
| Armin Falk; Michael Kosfeld
|
| 发表日期 | 2004-08-23
|
| 出版年 | 2004
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We show experimentally that a principal's distrust in the voluntary performance of an agent has a negative impact on the agent's motivation to perform well. Before the agent chooses his performance, the principal in our experiment decides whether he wants to restrict the agents' choice set by implementing a minimum performance level for the agent. Since both parties have conflicting interests, restriction is optimal for the principal whenever the latter expects the agent to behave opportunistically. We find that most principals in our experiment do not restrict the agent's choice set but trust that the agent will perform well voluntarily. Principals who trust induce, on average, a higher performance and hence earn higher payoffs than principals who control. The reason is that most agents lower their performance as a response to the signal of distrust created by the principal's decision to limit their choice set. Our results shed new light on dysfunctional effects of explicit incentives as well as the puzzling incompleteness of many economic contracts. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics
|
| 关键词 | Trust
Distrust
Motivation
Principal-agent relationship
Incentives
Control
Incomplete contracts
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4512
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533457
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Armin Falk,Michael Kosfeld. DP4512 Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control. 2004.
|
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