| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4513 |
| DP4513 Knowledge Disclosure, Patents and Optimal Organization of Research and Development | |
| Sudipto Bhattacharya; Sergei Guriev | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We model a new effect of exclusivity on non-contractible investments in buyer/seller relationships. By restricting the buyer to purchase from only one seller, exclusivity increases the buyer?s costs of haggling during renegotiation and hence the seller?s relative bargaining power and bargaining share. This in turn fosters the seller?s incentives to invest even for investments that are fully specific to the relationship (?internal investments?), in contrast to a recent finding by Segal and Whinston (2000b). |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Bargaining Contracting Exclusive dealing Incomplete contracts investment Foreclosure |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4513 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533458 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sudipto Bhattacharya,Sergei Guriev. DP4513 Knowledge Disclosure, Patents and Optimal Organization of Research and Development. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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