| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4514 |
| DP4514 A General Test of Gaming | |
| Pascal Courty; Gerald Marschke | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A common-agency lobbying model is developed to help understand why North America and the European Union have adopted such different policies towards genetically modified food. Our results show that when firms (in this case farmers) lobby policy-makers to influence standards and consumers and environmentalists care about the choice of standard, it is possible that increased competition from abroad can lead to strategic incentives to raise standards, not just lower them as shown in earlier models. This theoretical proposition is supported by numerical results from a global general equilibrium model of GM adoption in America without and with an EU moratorium. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Gmos Political economy Regulation of standards Trade policy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4514 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533459 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pascal Courty,Gerald Marschke. DP4514 A General Test of Gaming. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Pascal Courty]的文章 |
| [Gerald Marschke]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Pascal Courty]的文章 |
| [Gerald Marschke]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Pascal Courty]的文章 |
| [Gerald Marschke]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
