| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4520 |
| DP4520 Performance and Behaviour of Family Firms: Evidence from the French Stock Market | |
| David Thesmar; David Sraer | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this Paper we examine the possibilities a principal in a public organization has to motivate agents for productivity improvements where standard stick and carrot incentives cannot be used. The principal?s only incentive device is a reallocation of budgets and tasks across agents depending on the extent of productivity improvements revealed by each agent. We first show that as long as agents do not collude, the principal can use rotation and tournament schemes to eliminate all slack in the organization. Second, to break collusion between agents, the principal must use discriminatory tournament schemes. In some cases, however, there does not exist an incentive scheme to overcome collusion. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Public organizations Incentive schemes Tournament and rotation schemes Collusion |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4520 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533465 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David Thesmar,David Sraer. DP4520 Performance and Behaviour of Family Firms: Evidence from the French Stock Market. 2004. |
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