| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4532 |
| DP4532 Conditional versus Contingent Fees | |
| Winand Emons | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper proposes a theory of the optimal organization of delegated expertise. For incentive purposes, a principal should reward an expert when their recommendation is confirmed either by the facts or by other experts? recommendations. With a single expert, we show that the agency costs of delegated expertise exhibit diseconomies of scale. Possible organizational responses to this problem include basing decisions on a less than optimal amount of information, and relying on multiple experts. We analyse the source of gains from having multiple experts in different contracting environments corresponding to different nexi of collusion between the principal and/or the experts. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Expertise Organization Collusion |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4532 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533477 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Winand Emons. DP4532 Conditional versus Contingent Fees. 2004. |
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