| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4538 |
| DP4538 Growth Accelerations | |
| Dani Rodrik; Ricardo Hausmann; Lant Pritchett | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A principal contracts with agents who have diverse abilities to forecast changes in their future tastes. While the principal knows that the agent?s tastes are changing, the agent believes that with probability ?, their future preferences will be identical to their present preferences. The principal does not observe ?, but knows the probability distribution from which it is drawn. Thus, the agent?s prior probability ? is their ?private type?, and the principal has to offer a menu of contracts in order to screen the agent?s type. We provide a full characterization of the principal?s optimal menu. The results allow us to interpret some real-life contractual arrangements in a variety of examples. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Contracts Dynamic inconsistency Naivety Non-common priors |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4538 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533478 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dani Rodrik,Ricardo Hausmann,Lant Pritchett. DP4538 Growth Accelerations. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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