| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4540 |
| DP4540 Contract Renewal and Incentives in Public Procurement | |
| Espen R. Moen; Christian Riis | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this Paper, we study the role of subsidies to fertility in ensuring the political viability of unfunded social security (SS). In our model, agents are heterogeneous in age and income. Young generations confront promises made previously by older generations, and in turn choose current levels of fertility subsidies, and future levels of social security benefits. We find that subsidies to the costs of children expand the set of equilibria, making social security viable where it would otherwise have to be abandoned. Moreover, the model successfully captures the observed evolution of social security and family support systems during the demographic transition. Our results indicate that the seemingly explosive evolution of SS taxes will be curbed once the underlying demographic transition is completed, after which the SS system will converge to a steady state lower than simple extrapolation of current trends would imply, and fertility will rebound with the aid of higher subsidy levels. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Political economy Olg models Social security Endogenous fertility Redistribution |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4540 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533480 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Espen R. Moen,Christian Riis. DP4540 Contract Renewal and Incentives in Public Procurement. 2004. |
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