| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4541 |
| DP4541 Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best? | |
| Steffen Hoernig; Pedro Barros | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The Paper studies the effects and the determinants of interregional redistribution in a model of residential and political choice. We find that paradoxical consequences of interjurisdictional transfers can arise if people are mobile: while self-sufficient regions are necessarily identical with respect to policies and average incomes in our model, interregional redistribution always leads to the divergence of regional policies and per capita incomes. Thus, interregional redistribution prevents interregional equality. As we show, however, it at the same time allows for more interpersonal equality among the inhabitants of each region. For this reason, the voting population may in a decision over the fiscal constitution deliberately implement such a transfer scheme to foster regional divergence. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Interregional transfers Fiscal federalism Migration Redistribution |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4541 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533481 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Steffen Hoernig,Pedro Barros. DP4541 Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best?. 2004. |
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