G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP4567
DP4567 Trust and Bribery: The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link With Crime
Jennifer Hunt
发表日期2004-08-23
出版年2004
语种英语
摘要This Paper introduces two complementary models of firm-specific training: an informational model and a productivity-enhancement model. In both models, market provision of firm-specific training is inefficient. The nature of the inefficiency depends, however, on the balance between the two key components of training, namely productivity enhancement and employee evaluation. In the informational model, training results in a proportionate increase in productivity enhancement and employee evaluation, and training is underprovided by the market. In the productivity-enhancement model, training results in an increase in productivity enhancement but no change in employee evaluation, and training is overprovided by the market. In both models, turnover is inefficiently low.
主题Labour Economics
关键词Firm-specific training Productivity enhancement Employee evaluation Firm-specific human capital
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp4567
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533485
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jennifer Hunt. DP4567 Trust and Bribery: The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link With Crime. 2004.
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