| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4567 |
| DP4567 Trust and Bribery: The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link With Crime | |
| Jennifer Hunt | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper introduces two complementary models of firm-specific training: an informational model and a productivity-enhancement model. In both models, market provision of firm-specific training is inefficient. The nature of the inefficiency depends, however, on the balance between the two key components of training, namely productivity enhancement and employee evaluation. In the informational model, training results in a proportionate increase in productivity enhancement and employee evaluation, and training is underprovided by the market. In the productivity-enhancement model, training results in an increase in productivity enhancement but no change in employee evaluation, and training is overprovided by the market. In both models, turnover is inefficiently low. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Firm-specific training Productivity enhancement Employee evaluation Firm-specific human capital |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4567 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533485 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jennifer Hunt. DP4567 Trust and Bribery: The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link With Crime. 2004. |
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