| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4578 |
| DP4578 Telecommunications Policies: Determinants and Impact | |
| Jordi Gual; Francesco Trillas | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | It is well known in personnel economics that firms may improve the quality of their workforce by offering performance pay. We analyse an equilibrium model where worker productivity is private information and show that the gains to the firms from worker self-selection may not be matched by a corresponding social gain. In particular, the equilibrium incentive to workers to exert too much effort. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Performance pay Selection Efficiency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4578 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533495 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jordi Gual,Francesco Trillas. DP4578 Telecommunications Policies: Determinants and Impact. 2004. |
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