| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4580 |
| DP4580 Firm-Specific Training | |
| Christopher J Harris; Leonardo Felli | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a model of two-stage cumulative research and development (R&D), in which one Research Unit (RU) with an innovative idea bargains to license her non-verifiable interim knowledge exclusively to one of two competing Development Units (DUs) via one of two alternative modes: an open sale after patenting this interim knowledge, or a closed sale in which precluding further disclosure to a competing DU requires the RU to hold a stake in the licensed DU?s post-invention revenues. Both modes lead to partial leakage of the RU?s knowledge from its description, to the licensed DU alone in a closed sale, and to both DUs in an open sale. We find that higher levels of interim knowledge are more likely to be licensed via closed sales. If the extent of leakage is lower, more RUs choose open sales, generating a non-monotonic relationship between the strength of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and aggregate R&D expenditures. We also develop a rationale for the ex ante acquisition of control rights over the RU by a DU, rooted in the RU?s incentives to create knowledge under alternative modes of sale thereof, and her wealth constraint in ex interim bargaining. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Patents Research and development Corporate venturing Sequantial innovation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4580 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533497 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christopher J Harris,Leonardo Felli. DP4580 Firm-Specific Training. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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