G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP4580
DP4580 Firm-Specific Training
Christopher J Harris; Leonardo Felli
发表日期2004-08-23
出版年2004
语种英语
摘要We develop a model of two-stage cumulative research and development (R&D), in which one Research Unit (RU) with an innovative idea bargains to license her non-verifiable interim knowledge exclusively to one of two competing Development Units (DUs) via one of two alternative modes: an open sale after patenting this interim knowledge, or a closed sale in which precluding further disclosure to a competing DU requires the RU to hold a stake in the licensed DU?s post-invention revenues. Both modes lead to partial leakage of the RU?s knowledge from its description, to the licensed DU alone in a closed sale, and to both DUs in an open sale. We find that higher levels of interim knowledge are more likely to be licensed via closed sales. If the extent of leakage is lower, more RUs choose open sales, generating a non-monotonic relationship between the strength of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and aggregate R&D expenditures. We also develop a rationale for the ex ante acquisition of control rights over the RU by a DU, rooted in the RU?s incentives to create knowledge under alternative modes of sale thereof, and her wealth constraint in ex interim bargaining.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Patents Research and development Corporate venturing Sequantial innovation
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp4580
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533497
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Christopher J Harris,Leonardo Felli. DP4580 Firm-Specific Training. 2004.
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