| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4581 |
| DP4581 From Stagnation to Growth: Unified Growth Theory | |
| Oded Galor | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An important lesson from the incentive literature is that explicit incentives may elicit dysfunctional and unintended responses, also known as gaming responses. The existence of these responses, however, is difficult to demonstrate in practice because this behaviour is typically hidden from the researcher. We present a simple model showing that one can identify gaming by estimating the correlation between a performance measure and the true goal of the organization before and after the measure has been activated. Our hypothesis is that gaming takes place if this correlation decreases with activation. Using data from a public sector organization, we find evidence consistent with our hypothesis. We draw implications for the selection of performance measures. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Performance incentive Performance measurement Gaming Multi-tasking Government organization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4581 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533498 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Oded Galor. DP4581 From Stagnation to Growth: Unified Growth Theory. 2004. |
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