G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP4586
DP4586 An Empirical Study of Liquidity and Information Effects of Order Flow on Exchange Rates
Paolo Vitale; Francis Breedon
发表日期2004-08-23
出版年2004
语种英语
摘要We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequality and political accountability undermine entry and financial development. Incumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potential entrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can promise larger political contributions than the entrants due to the higher rents earned with less competition. Entry and investor protection improve when wealth distribution becomes less unequal, and the political system becomes more accountable. Consistent with these predictions, in a cross-section of 38 countries we find that greater accountability is associated with higher entry in sectors that are more dependent on external capital and have greater growth opportunities. Also, higher accountability and lower income inequality are associated with more effective legal enforcement, even after controlling for legal origin and per-capita income.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Politics Entry Financial development entrepreneurship Investor protection Income inequality Growth
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp4586
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533503
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Paolo Vitale,Francis Breedon. DP4586 An Empirical Study of Liquidity and Information Effects of Order Flow on Exchange Rates. 2004.
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