| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4594 |
| DP4594 Optimal Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge | |
| Klaus Adam | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this Paper we use data from industrial plants to investigate if seniority-based pay is used as a motivational device for production workers. Alternatively, seniority-based pay could simply be a wage-setting rule not necessarily related to the provision of incentives. Unlike previous papers, we use a direct measure of seniority-based pay as well as measures of monitoring devices and piece-rates. We find that firms that offer seniority-based pay are less likely to offer explicit incentives. They are also less likely to invest in monitoring devices. We also find that firms that offer seniority-based pay are more likely to engage in other human resource management policies that result in long employment relationships. Overall these results suggest that seniority-based pay is indeed used as a motivation device. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | M52 Human resource management practices Incentives Monitoring |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4594 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533515 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Klaus Adam. DP4594 Optimal Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge. 2004. |
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