| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4596 |
| DP4596 Labour Productivity in the US and the UK During the 19th Century | |
| Stephen Broadberry; Douglas Irwin | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Firing costs due to employment protection legislation have two separate dimensions: a transfer from the firm to the worker to be laid off and a tax paid outside the firm-worker pair. We document that quantitatively transfers are a much larger component than taxes. Nevertheless, to avoid the ?bonding critique? most of the existing literature overlooks the transfer component by making the implicit assumption that, in the presence of wage rigidity, mandatory severance payments have the same real effects as firing taxes. This Paper shows, in the context of a search model with insider and outsider workers, that this presumption is in general misplaced: the impact of severance payments on unemployment is qualitatively different from that of firing taxes, and it varies according to the bite of the wage rigidity. When the wage rigidity is endogenously determined by a centralized monopoly union of insiders, severance payments are either neutral or they increase unemployment, depending on the union?s coverage of outsiders? contracts. This prediction finds empirical support in a panel dataset of OECD countries. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Firing tax Severance payment Unemployment Wage rigidity |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4596 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533517 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stephen Broadberry,Douglas Irwin. DP4596 Labour Productivity in the US and the UK During the 19th Century. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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