| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4601 |
| DP4601 Determinants of International Activity: Evidence from the Chemical Industry | |
| Andrea Fosfuri | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Empirical evidence suggests that the distribution of earnings reports exhibits kinks. Managers manage earnings as if to meet exogenously pre-specified targets, such as avoiding losses and avoiding a decrease in earnings. This is puzzling because the compensation to managers at these pre-specified targets seems to be smooth. We propose a game theoretic model explaining this phenomenon. In our model, investors form expectations of such a manipulative behaviour by the manager. Given these expectations, the best response of the manager is to fulfill the investors? expectations, resulting in a discontinuity in the distribution of earnings reports. Our model generates several new empirical predictions regarding the existence of the kink, its size and its location relative to the distribution of earnings reports. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Managerial compensation Stock-based compensation Earnings reports Earnings management Analysts forecasts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4601 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533522 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrea Fosfuri. DP4601 Determinants of International Activity: Evidence from the Chemical Industry. 2004. |
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