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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP4606 |
DP4606 Is Seniority-Based Pay Used as a Motivation Device? Evidence from Plant Level Data | |
José Enrique Galdón Sánchez; maia guell; Alberto Bayo-Moriones | |
发表日期 | 2004-09-23 |
出版年 | 2004 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We describe firm pricing when consumers follow simple reservation price rules. In stark contrast to other models in the literature, this approach yields price dispersion in pure strategies even when firms have the same marginal costs. At the equilibrium, lower price firms earn higher profits. The range of price dispersion increases with the number of firms: the highest price is the monopoly one, while the lowest price tends to marginal cost. The average transaction price remains substantially above marginal cost even with many firms. The equilibrium pricing pattern is the same when prices are chosen sequentially. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Price dispersion Reservation price rule Passive search |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4606 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533527 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | José Enrique Galdón Sánchez,maia guell,Alberto Bayo-Moriones. DP4606 Is Seniority-Based Pay Used as a Motivation Device? Evidence from Plant Level Data. 2004. |
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