| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4610 |
| DP4610 The Feldstein-Horioka Fact | |
| Domenico Giannone; Michele Lenza | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Democratic processes may not take the welfare of future generations sufficiently into account and thus may not achieve sustainability. We show that the dual democratic mechanism ? rejection/support rewards (RSRs) for politicians and elections ? can achieve sustainability. RSRs stipulate that incumbents who are not re-elected, but obtain the majority support among young voters receive a particular monetary or non-monetary reward. Such rejection/support rewards induce politicians to undertake long-term beneficial policies, but may invite excessive reward-seeking. We identify optimal RSRs under different informational circumstances. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Q56 Democracy Elections Incentive contracts Sustainability Rejection/support rewards |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4610 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533531 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Domenico Giannone,Michele Lenza. DP4610 The Feldstein-Horioka Fact. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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