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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP4631 |
DP4631 Wealth Concentration in a Developing Economy: Paris and France, 1807-1994 | |
Thomas Piketty; Jean Laurent Rosenthal; Gilles Postel-Vinay | |
发表日期 | 2004-09-23 |
出版年 | 2004 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We analyse a simple ?tariffs-cum-foreign competition? policy targeted at enhancing the competitive position of a domestic, developing country firm that competes with its developed country counterpart on the domestic market and that carries out innovative (imitative) effort. We evaluate this policy with respect to social welfare, type of oligopoly conduct, information requirement, time consistency and possibility of manipulative behaviour and conclude that the most robust policy set-up is that in which the domestic government is unable to pre-commit to the level of its policy. Finally, we examine this policy, allowing for asymmetric information, and show that the corresponding social welfare may be higher than under perfect information set-up. |
主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
关键词 | Optimal tariff protection Government non-commitment regime Innovative (imitative) effort Symmetric versus asymmetric information |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4631 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533551 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Piketty,Jean Laurent Rosenthal,Gilles Postel-Vinay. DP4631 Wealth Concentration in a Developing Economy: Paris and France, 1807-1994. 2004. |
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