G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP4636
DP4636 Forecasting Time Series Subject to Multiple Structural Breaks
M. Hashem Pesaran; Henry Allan Timmermann; Davide Pettenuzzo
发表日期2004-09-23
出版年2004
语种英语
摘要When stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, relations with social activists may become an effective entrenchment strategy for inefficient CEOs. We thus argue that managerial turnover and firm value are increased by the institutionalization of stakeholder protection depriving incumbent CEOs of activists? support. This finding provides a rationale for the emergence of specialized institutions (social auditors and ethic indexes) that help firms commit to stakeholder protection even in case of managerial replacement. Our theory also explains a recent trend whereby social activist organizations and institutional shareholders are showing a growing support for each others? agenda.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Corporate governance Corporate social responsibility Managerial entrenchment Social activism Stakeholders
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp4636
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533556
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
M. Hashem Pesaran,Henry Allan Timmermann,Davide Pettenuzzo. DP4636 Forecasting Time Series Subject to Multiple Structural Breaks. 2004.
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