| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4647 |
| DP4647 Fiscal and Monetary Interaction: The Role of Asymmetries of the Stability and Growth Pact in EMU | |
| Sylvester Eijffinger; Matteo Governatori | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper explores how the government?s choice of renewal policy in public procurement programmes can be used as a mechanism to provide firms with incentives to supply quality. Several firms produce a public service. The firms participate in a tournament where they are ranked according to the quality of their services, and rewarded in terms of contract renewals. We analyse the firms? incentives to produce high-quality services, and find that they are maximized if 50% of the contracts are renewed. The optimal renewal policy trades off incentive provision (which requires that a relatively large fraction of the firms are replaced each period) against the entry costs of new firms. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Public procurement Quality Tournament Contract renewal |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4647 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533567 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sylvester Eijffinger,Matteo Governatori. DP4647 Fiscal and Monetary Interaction: The Role of Asymmetries of the Stability and Growth Pact in EMU. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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