| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4648 |
| DP4648 Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment | |
| Giovanni Cespa | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Inspired by the creation of the new Competition Authority in Portugal, we consider the interplay between regulatory agencies with overlapping competencies; for example, a competition authority and a sectoral regulator. We analyse how authorities? incentives are affected if they can decide independently, or must follow each others? opinions, respectively, and consider how this relationship performs in the presence of institutional biases and lobbying efforts. It is found that the best results tend to be achieved when the authorities act independently of each other: the probability of coming to a decision is higher, and decisions are less vulnerable to lobbying. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Competition authority Sectoral regulators Institutional relationship Strategic substitutes and complements Lobbying |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4648 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533568 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giovanni Cespa. DP4648 Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment. 2004. |
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