| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4667 |
| DP4667 Information Sales and Insider Trading | |
| Giovanni Cespa | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-10-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Fundamental information resembles in many respects a durable good. Hence, the effects of its incorporation into stock prices depend on who is the agent controlling its flow. Similarly to a durable goods monopolist, a monopolistic analyst selling information intertemporally competes against themself. This forces them to partially relinquish control over the information flow to traders. Conversely, an insider solves the intertemporal competition problem through vertical integration, thus exerting a tighter control over the flow of information. Comparing market patterns I show that a dynamic market where information is provided by an analyst is thicker and more informative than one where an insider trades. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Information sales Analysts Insider trading Durable goods monopolist |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4667 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533588 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giovanni Cespa. DP4667 Information Sales and Insider Trading. 2004. |
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