| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4670 |
| DP4670 Political Institutions, Environmental Policy and Growth | |
| Thomas I Renström; Laura Marsiliani | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-10-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study taxation externalities in federations of benevolent governments. Where different hierarchical government levels tax the same base, one can observe two types of externalities: a horizontal externality, working among governments of the same level and leading to tax rates that are too low compared to the social optimum; and a vertical externality, working between different levels of government and leading to sub-optimally high tax rates. Building on the model of Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002), we derive a discriminating hypothesis to distinguish vertical and horizontal tax externalities based on observable variables. This test is applied to a panel dataset on local taxes in a sample of Swiss municipalities that feature direct-democratic fiscal decision making, so as to maximize the correspondence with the benevolent.governments of the theory. We find that vertical externalities dominate - they are thus an observed empirical phenomenon as well as a notable extension to the theory of tax competition. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Tax competition Horizontal externalities Vertical externalities Fiscal federalism Swiss tax system |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4670 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533591 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas I Renström,Laura Marsiliani. DP4670 Political Institutions, Environmental Policy and Growth. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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