| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4700 |
| DP4700 Optimal Domestic Regulation and the Pattern of Trade | |
| Thierry Verdier; David Martimort | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-10-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper develops a model for analysing the costs and benefits of intellectual property enforcement in LDCs. The North is more productive than the South and is the only source of innovator. There are two types of goods, and each bloc has a comparative advantage in producing a specific type of good. If comparative advantage is strong enough, even under piracy there are goods that the South will not produce. Piracy will then lead to a reallocation of innovative activity in favour of these goods. That may harm consumers (including consumers in the South) to the extent that these goods have smaller dynamic learning externalities than the other goods, and that their share in consumption is small. Thus, whether or not piracy is in the interest of the South depends on how important are the goods for which it has a comparative advantage to its consumers, and what the growth potential of these goods is. While, all else equal, the North tends to lose more (or gain less) from piracy than the South, because monopoly profits eventually accrue to the North, the South may lose more than the North if there is a strong enough home bias in favour of the goods for which it has a comparative advantage. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Piracy Intellectual property Innovation Growth Comparative advantage |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4700 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533618 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thierry Verdier,David Martimort. DP4700 Optimal Domestic Regulation and the Pattern of Trade. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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