G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP4704
DP4704 Optimal Rewards in Contests
Aner Sela; Todd Kaplan; Chen Cohen
发表日期2004-10-23
出版年2004
语种英语
摘要The Paper sets out the principles that should underlie sovereign debt restructuring. It argues for a rules-based approach to achieve private sector involvement in restructuring. The rules must operate, however, in the context of an appropriate institutional framework with appropriate incentives. The markets cannot and will not create these institutions without some official intervention. The Paper discusses why intervention in the form of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism has been shelved. It goes on to consider a new institutional framework, with a permanent bondholders? committee and collective action clauses (CACs) in bond contracts. It stresses the need for uniformity in CACs. After interpreting the views of market participants on CACs, the Paper concludes with an argument for official intervention to make CACs universal.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Collective action clauses Financial crises Sovereign debt
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp4704
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533622
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Aner Sela,Todd Kaplan,Chen Cohen. DP4704 Optimal Rewards in Contests. 2004.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Aner Sela]的文章
[Todd Kaplan]的文章
[Chen Cohen]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Aner Sela]的文章
[Todd Kaplan]的文章
[Chen Cohen]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Aner Sela]的文章
[Todd Kaplan]的文章
[Chen Cohen]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。