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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP4715 |
DP4715 Agglomeration and Welfare: The Core-Periphery Model in the Light of Bentham, Kaldor and Rawls | |
Jacques-François Thisse; Frédéric Robert-Nicoud; Sylvie Charlot; Carl Gaigné | |
发表日期 | 2004-10-23 |
出版年 | 2004 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We study a procedure for selling multiple heterogenous goods, which is commonly used in practice but rarely studied in the literature. The novel feature of this procedure is that instead of selling the goods themselves, the seller offers buyers the right to choose among the available goods. Thus, buyers who are after completely different goods are forced to compete for the same good, the ?right to choose?. Competition can be further enhanced by restricting the number of rights that are sold. This is shown both theoretically and experimentally. Our main experimental finding is that by auctioning ?rights-to-choose? rather than the goods themselves, the seller induces an aggressive bidding behaviour that generates more revenue than the theoretical optimal mechanism. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Right-to-choose auctions Experimental auctions Behavioural mechanism-design |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4715 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533633 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jacques-François Thisse,Frédéric Robert-Nicoud,Sylvie Charlot,et al. DP4715 Agglomeration and Welfare: The Core-Periphery Model in the Light of Bentham, Kaldor and Rawls. 2004. |
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