| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4685 |
| DP4685 Industry/University S&T Transfers: What Can We Learn From Belgian CIS-2 Data? | |
| Henri Capron; Michele Cincera | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-11-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study all-pay contests under incomplete information where the reward is a function of the contestant's type and effort. We analyse the optimal reward for the designer when the reward is either multiplicatively separable or additively separable in effort and type. In the multiplicatively separable environment the optimal reward is always positive while in the additively separable environment it may also be negative. In both environments, depending on the designer's utility, the optimal reward may either increase or decrease in the contestants' effort. Finally, in both environments, the designer's payoff depends only upon the expected value of the effort-dependent rewards and not the number of rewards. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Contests All-pay auctions Optimal design |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4685 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533640 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Henri Capron,Michele Cincera. DP4685 Industry/University S&T Transfers: What Can We Learn From Belgian CIS-2 Data?. 2004. |
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