| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4722 |
| DP4722 Dividend Taxes and Corporate Behaviour: Evidence from the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut | |
| Emmanuel Saez; Raj Chetty | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-11-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine financial intermediation when banks can offer deposit or loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks. We show that the risk allocation is efficient provided there is no workout of banking crises. In this case, banks will shift part of the risk to depositors. In contrast, under a workout of banking crises, depositors receive non-contingent contracts with high interest rates while entrepreneurs obtain loan contracts that demand a high repayment in good times and little in bad times. As a result, the present generation overinvests and banks create large macroeconomic risks for future generations, even if the underlying risk is small or zero. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Financial intermediation Macroeconomic risks State contingent contracts Banking regulation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4722 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533641 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Emmanuel Saez,Raj Chetty. DP4722 Dividend Taxes and Corporate Behaviour: Evidence from the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut. 2004. |
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