| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4734 |
| DP4734 Properties of Scoring Auctions | |
| Estelle Cantillon; John Asker | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-11-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Consider Holmström.s moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has a a(i)-dimensional strategy space and output can be m-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements an efficient allocation generically exists if and only if Sum_a(i)/(n-1)< m. When this condition is satisfied, the optimal mechanism discourages collusive behavior and, under a weak condition, filters out inefficient equilibria. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Teams Moral hazard Incentives Theory of the firm |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4734 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533652 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Estelle Cantillon,John Asker. DP4734 Properties of Scoring Auctions. 2004. |
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