| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4736 |
| DP4736 Public Safety and the Moral Dilemma in the Defense Against Terror | |
| Arye L. Hillman; Miriam Krausz; Raphael Franck | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-11-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The economic theory of defense has traditionally described public safety as achieved through investments that deter adversaries. Deterrence is however ineffective, and preemptive defense is required, when a population of intended victims confronts supreme-value suicide terror. A moral dilemma then arises, since preemption may impose collective punishment, while, in the absence of preemption, the population of intended victims is exposed to acts of terror. We consider how a population of intended terror victims confronts the moral dilemma, and compare the threatened population?s response with the public-safety recommendations of external judges who are not personally affected by the threat of terror. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Defense economics Defensive preemption Counter-terrorism Terror International judges Profiling |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4736 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533654 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Arye L. Hillman,Miriam Krausz,Raphael Franck. DP4736 Public Safety and the Moral Dilemma in the Defense Against Terror. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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